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combed through the institutions which house most of this capacity:
the European Commission, the largest bureaucratic organisation within the EU system, which represents supranational perspectives (Nugent & Rhinard, 2015) ; and the Council of the EU, which represents national perspectives and is growing its own administrative capacity (Christiansen & Vanhoonacker, 2008) . Together, these institutions contain the most administration capacity of the EU and most of its crisis management capacities. We include some EU agencies when their capacities are closely linked to the European Commission but have not comprehensively mapped agencies (for more on agencies and transboundary crisis management, see Boin, Busuioc, & Groenleer, 2014) . We exclude the European External Action Service, as our main focus in this article is capacities related to managing transboundary crises in Europe. The sheer volume of data precludes its full presentation here, but we have made the database publicly available elsewhere, online.
2 The data constitutes the most comprehensive accounting of the EU's role as a "transboundary crisis manager" to date, considering that previous research focused on a narrower set of analytical categories and completed data collection in 2012 (Boin, Ekengren, et al., 2013) . The goal in this article is to summarise and analyse the data in terms of one of the more recent academic frameworks in crisis management research-the key tasks facing transboundary crisis managers (Boin, Kuipers, et al., 2013; Boin et al., 2016 )-and to draw out key implications for future research. Discussing EU capacities related to each of these key tasks highlights underappreciated trends and critical gaps and allows us to look across the EU's many policy sectors. In the conclusion, we suggest tentative hypotheses to take forward in future research, and invite the crisis management research community to take part by identifying additional lines of research.
| CONCEPTUALISING TRANSBOUNDARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPACITY
Why should we study transboundary crisis management, and more particularly, why in the EU political setting? Answering this question directs our attention to two kinds of literature. The first literature is presented often in the pages of this journal. Crisis management research examines the multifold challenges that crises present to the political-administrative level of governance systems (Rosenthal, Boin, & Comfort, 2001) . In this literature, emphasis has traditionally been less on the crisis (defined typically as any threat to common values, which must be handled under conditions of urgency and uncertainty) and more on the desired response capacities within a governance system. Capacities tend to be grouped by scholars in the categories of "prevention," "preparation," "response," and "recovery" (Comfort, 2002) . Those categories are seen as challenging areas requiring special kinds of capacity building to successfully manage crises (Rosenthal, Charles, &`t Hart, 1989; .
This kind of crisis management literature has undergone two major developments of late, both of which are addressed by this article. The first is a renewed focus on the nature of the crisis.
Recent studies have explored a new species of crisis: the transboundary crises (Ansell et al., 2010; Boin & Rhinard, 2008) . Transboundary crises are those with characteristics from the previous definition, but which generate new problems in that they originate, travel, and become manifest across multiple kinds of boundaries:
geographic, policy, political, cultural, language, and legal. This focus illuminates the challenges of crisis management in a technologically interconnected, globalised world, and directs attention towards the supra-or inter-national levels that may have to be involved in crisis management.
A second development in the crisis management literature is a refinement in the analytical categories in which "crisis management capacities" are often discussed and measured. Recently, the prevention, preparation, response, and recovery continuum have been nuanced. In 2005, based on policymakers' perceptions of crisis management practice, five critical tasks for crisis leadership were defined; sense-making, decision-making, meaning-making, terminating, and learning (Boin et al. 2005: 10) . Since then, these tasks have been further refined into seven key, strategic activities critical for the effective and legitimate management of crises (Boin, Kuipers, et al., 2013; Boin et al., 2016: 147-148 ).
These seven activities, namely detection, sense-making, decisionmaking, coordination, meaning-making, communication, and accountability, aim to capture both the process as well as the challenging tasks involved in effective transboundary crisis management. The assumption here is that performing these tasks will support public trust in the functioning of institutions, and that a successful collective response and mitigation of a common threat may even increase legitimacy of involved institutions (Boin et al., 2016:13) .
| Detection
The detection task is about recognising emerging and actual risks and threats through, for example, mechanism, procedures, software, or systems put in place for horizon scanning and/or threat identification (Boin, Kuipers, et al., 2013: 82; Meyer & de Franco, 2011) .
Timely crisis recognition is quite challenging, given that a crisis often starts with only vague indications that something out of the ordinary may be taking place. This puts decision-makers in a tough situation where they must grasp the situation and respond based on information that is likely to be confusing, inconsistent, and over-abundant (Boin et al. 2005:38) . Timely detection is further complicated by complex organisational environments with many actors and intransigent institutional constraints.
| Sense-making
Sense-making regards the task of collecting, systematically analysing, and distributing critical information which helps to generate a shared situational picture (Boin, Kuipers, et al., 2013: 82-83 in order to take appropriate countermeasures-a task easier said than done given the often massive stream of information surrounding an emerging crisis (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) . In cases of transboundary crises, the sense-making task becomes even harder with extensive numbers of involved actors and stakeholders who have to reconcile conflicting perspectives in attempting to form a common situational picture.
| Decision-making
The decision-making task entails making (joint) critical strategic decisions in relation to the identified threat or crisis, acting based on the information available, and formulating an effective strategy to implement decisions (Boin et al., 2016: 16-17) . Moreover, the decisionmaking task is shaped by institutional context and is not only about agency and leadership-as it often requires adaption of public bureaucracies. Indeed, decision-making is less straightforward than sometimes assumed and more about managing a complex process in which leader-driven adaptation to stressful circumstances is the key challenge (Boin, Kuipers, et al., 2013: 83) .
| Coordination
There are usually an extensive number of actors, agencies, and organisations involved in transboundary crisis management (Rhinard & Sundelius, 2010) . Failing to coordinate can lead to gaps or overlaps in measures taken, as well as to conflicts between involved parties (Comfort & Kapucu, 2006) . The coordination task, therefore, entails challenges such as identifying key actors and partners and facilitating collaboration between them in relation to risk, threat, or crisis (Boin et al., 2016:17) .
| Meaning-making/communication
The meaning-making task, in turn, involves challenges such as formulating a message of what has happened in relation to the crisis, providing advice, and explaining measures taken in order to achieve a sense that leaders are in control of the situation. This task is important for decision-makers' credibility and, if done effectively, can help garner support and public understanding for their decisions during the crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2009) . Closely linked to meaningmaking is the communication task, which is about effective broadcasting of a message regarding the risk, threat, or crisis to selected audiences such as the public, the media, victims, etc. (Boin et al., 2016:18) .
| Accountability
Finally, the task of rendering accountability concerns explaining decisions, strategies, and actions initiated before, during, and after the crisis. This includes processes of feedback, stakeholder dialogue, and learning (Boin et al., 2016:19) . The challenge to effective accountability is the prevalence of "blame games" during and after crisis moments (Br€ andstr€ om, Kuipers, & Dal eus, 2008; Hood, 2002) .
Capacities for rendering accountability include transparent processes for assessing how, why, and with what affect crisis managers took action during crises (Boin, Kuipers, et al., 2013; Kuipers & 't Hart, 2014) Another literature implicated by this study is that on the institutional politics of the European Union. EU scholars have been slow to recognise the EU's role in crisis management (but see Wendling 2010 , Tercovich 2014 , Morsut, 2014 Boin, Rhinard, and Ekengren, 2013) . Scholars tend to focus on traditional areas of EU cooperation:
normally those boxed within easy to define policy sector areas.
Transboundary crisis management crosses policy areas and boundaries, however, which means it does not fit easily into existing scholarly agendas (Rhinard, 2015) . And yet transboundary crisis management generates a number of critical questions relevant to those interested in Europe's highly complicated multilevel governance system. One is the way in which crisis policy responsibilities are divided amongst local, national, and supranational authorities (Hollis 2015) . Another is how crisis management responsibilities at the EU level are shared amongst different institutions in Brussels.
Scholars of the EU have long studied the relative balance of power amongst the European Commission, for instance, as a quasi-independent body with a constitutional duty to represent the European collective rather than individual states (Nugent, 2010 concern in EU studies and international relations regarding which issues enter supranational agendas (Pollack, 1999; Princen & Rhinard, 2006 The categories were applied to seven sectors (policy areas) in which the EU actively governs and which are most relevant to the phenomenon of transboundary crises, namely: transport, health, cyber security energy, counter-terrorism, civil protection, and migration. Additionally, we assessed if the capacities were concerned with precrisis or actual-crisis activity. Pre-crisis capacities are those focused on "getting ready" for crises (such as horizon-scanning, assessing risks, and conducting exercises). Actual-crisis capacities are those activated when a potential or actual crisis emerges (such as decision protocols, aid deployment, or communication strategies). To capture trends over time, we recorded adoption dates (to the extent possible) and, in the database accessible elsewhere (see endnote ii), noted whether capacities were created before or after 2013 (the last scholarly record of developments). As noted above, research was limited to capacities focused mainly on crisis management in the European region, and excluded crisis management focused only on the EU institutions themselves, such as business continuity planning.
Regarding data collection, we applied open source scanning which proceeded in three steps within each sector. We started by examining Commission sector-specific websites (largely found in individual Directorates-General websites). This was complemented by in-site Google searches for lexicon such as "crises," "threats," "emergencies," "disasters," "preparedness," "early warning," and "urgent" to widen the search. Then, we turned to EU legislative databases such as Eur-Lex, generating search results in different sectors that enabled us to see if we missed any significant capacities. Eur-Lex allows for some formal search terms (such as "civil protection") but to further widen the search we included key word searches using the terms above. Finally, secondary sources-scholarly and other analytical studies-were consulted to see if any data escaped our earlier searches. All sources are dated and documented in the above-mentioned database. 3 We should note that our assessment of capacities was based on their presence (or existence) rather than their quality; in other words, discussion of the operational effectiveness of these capacities is outside the scope of this study-but certainly of great interest for future research (see conclusions).
4
Moreover, as our findings are based mainly on open source scanning, we map the capacities whose existence is communicated publicly in some way.
| EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
We now turn to the substance of the article: the presentation of the data set. We organise the presentation of EU crisis management capacities in terms of the seven key tasks associated with modern crisis management.
| Detection
Our study mapped a total of 57 EU capacities devoted to the timely recognition of an emerging risk or threat. We found that EU detection capacities tend to be quite specific, often focusing on a particular kind of threat or risk. Therefore, it was no surprise that we found not just one but several detection capacities within each of the sectors studied. Each subsector, we discovered, has its own systems for horizon scanning, monitoring, and early warning devoted to specific threats. For example, the transport sector has specific detection systems for sea, rail, and air, respectively. The European Maritime Security Agency has several vessel monitoring capacities such as SafeSeaNet and the EU Long Range Identification and Tracking system. Related to railway security, the EU has developed railway electromagnetic attack detection sensors through the 'SECRET'-project, 5 and the air subsector has a monitoring system called the Network Operations Portal (NOP), which allows users to react to events faster, monitor performance, and report functionality (or more accurately, non-functionality).
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Another example is the health sector, in which few diseases are without a specific detection system. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) through the Epidemic Intelligence Information System (EPIS) has no less than five detection platforms for different types of disease. For instance, working with officials in EU civil protection cooperation, health officials help to run a system to detect CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) threats from an intentional source (RAS-BICHAT), which is separate from CBRN threats from accidental sources (RAS-CHEM).
Moreover, the migration sector has capacities regarding detection of third country nationals crossing EU borders through the use of three Perhaps related to the proliferation trend, we also note consolidation efforts. "Systems of systems" seem to be on the rise when compared to previous research (Boin, Ekengren, & Rhinard, 2006 , 2014a ARGUS is the Commission Secretariat-General's effort to build a single platform for all detection systems. At least one Commission insider described it the following terms: real crises lead to new detection systems, which in turn lead to efforts to link them together after initial attention fades (Interview 7).
| Sense-making
Our results were surprisingly robust in the sense-making category, especially when viewed in temporal perspective. In fact, our study found the most capacities falling within this analytical category:
about 85 capacities in total. Clearly, much EU-level effort goes into Our results regarding sense-making fall into two broad categories. The first concerns capacities related to making sense of risks, threats, and vulnerabilities before they turn in to actual crises. The financial intelligence network fits into this category, in that it seeks to assess which emerging problems might be "actionable". Another example is the EU Internet Forum, a private-public cooperation framework that brings together representatives from the Internet industry, Europol, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, the European Parliament, and EU interior ministers. It encourages discussions on how to combat online radicalisation and protect citizens from terrorism exploitation. 11 The EU Internet Forum is a central initiative of the European Agenda on Security, which introduced the "Security Union" concept, from early 2015. 12 In December 2015, the Commission held the first EU Internet Forum meeting, discussing and agreeing on the importance of effective mechanisms for private-public cooperation to efficiently and swiftly remove terrorist content online, and to counter terrorist narratives. The participants also agreed on using the umbrella of the EU IT Forum to enhance coordination in counter-terrorism work.
11
The second category contains sense-making procedures and bodies for actual unfolding crises. They often involve marshalling expert group input for use in crisis. Examples include the Council's stakeholder advisory group on maritime security, which is expected to be ready when a maritime-related event takes place, and the counterterrorism first response network, which convenes during an attack.
Another is the CSIRT-network, which can, after a report on a cyber incident with potential cross-border effect, discuss and assess the BACKMAN AND RHINARD | 5 cyber incident. As mentioned, we have very little information on whether these tools actually work in practice, and how well. Some sectors with many new capacities, such as the cybersecurity sector or the counter-terrorism sectors, have several untested tools, instruments, and networks.
It is worth noting a key trend here, which becomes apparent when compared with previous analyses on EU sense-making (Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard, 2014a) : systems originally designed for information collection (e.g., largely about detection) have been "enriched"
with an analytical function (e.g., sense-making). In critical infrastructure protection, the CIWIN system (Critical Infrastructure Warning and Information Network) not only collects information (about problems in different infrastructures) but also enriches the data through analysis. The same goes for the EPIS-systems of the health sector, as well as with RAS-BICHAT and RAS-CHEM (the detection/early warning systems for chemical accidents and CBRN attacks). Another example is EFFIS (detection/early warning system focusing on forest fires) and EFAS (detection/early warning system focusing on floods), which detects but also analyses and distributes information on emerging threats. That is, many systems or networks which fall into the category of detection also fall within the category of sense-making due to the fact that they-in addition to detection-also perform analysis of the collected data and distribute that assessment to stakeholders in order to create a common situational picture. 
| Decision-making

| Coordination
We found a plethora of coordination capacities, arguably because coordination is the very essence of the EU's role in crises (Boin, Ekengren, et al., 2013 Capacities for use during a crisis blend somewhat with the "partial" decision-making capacities described above. What the EU considers decision-making capacities are actually coordination capacities according to our framework. Thus, the European Response Coordination Centre (ERCC), the IPCR, the Health Emergency Operations Facility (HEOF, in Luxembourg), and the European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC) are all sometimes considered "decision platforms," but are more accurately described as coordination centres.
Moving beyond the decision-making vs. coordination issue, another reason that coordination efforts have grown in Brussels is the increasing number of actors involved in various crisis issue areas. 13 As mentioned earlier, the rise of new agencies, new member state officials, increased public-private relations, and new staff focused on crisis issues makes coordination more complicated than in previous years. Besides creating a need for more sense-making capacities, this also increases the need for supranational coordination. As described by Boin, Ekengren, et al. (2013) 
| Accountability
Like meaning-making/communication, accountability is a task that does not different greatly amongst issue areas. So here we provide a cross-sectoral assessment of accountability for the EU institutions under examination. As mentioned, accountability involves the rendering of an explanation, in a public forum, the relevant decisions and strategies that were initiated before, during and after the crisis.
It is largely about the mechanisms by which officials can be held to account for their actions. It includes processes of and mechanisms for "lesson-learning" after crises.
In general, we can focus on three versions of accountability in the EU (Scharpf, 1999) . Input-forms of accountability concern the relationship between citizens and those democratically chosen to represent them. National leaders taking decisions in the Council of the EU and European Council are accountable to their respective national publics, for instance. Collectively, however, national leaders are not accountable to a European public since each represents only his/her respective citizens. Through-put versions of accountability concern how citizens can understand and hold to account the procedures and ways crises are handled. The EU machinery for acting on crises is not particularly transparent or easily comprehensible. Worse still, crisis-specific procedures do not always follow the familiar Community Method of decision-making. Output forms of accountability concern holding leaders to account for their performance during crises. What decisions were taken, why and did they work? Here, accountability mechanisms are somewhat strong. First, the EU's institutional checks-and-balances encourage oversight and investigations into one another. The European Parliament takes seriously its role as "watchdog" over other institutions, launching countless investigations. Second, the Brussels Press Corps is active and large-by some counts, the largest in the world-and can shine light and ask tough questions regarding crisis management performance. That said, the "blame game" that is so prevalent in post-crisis situations at the national level (Hood, 2002 ) is likely to be intense in a multi-level governance system like the EU. With its intentionally unclear division of competences (Nugent, 2010) , the EU's national and supranational officials may very well point fingers at one another for crisis management failures.
In terms of lesson-learning, we uncovered evidence of a moderate amount of processes and mechanisms. Lesson-learning is most prevalent in the aftermath of crisis exercises, when "hot wash" discussions and analysis outline problems that need fixing. Other lesson-learning takes place following actual events. For example, investigations into transport sector accidents and incidents, and the recommendations and conclusions drawn from them, are fairly frequent and are said to play an important role in prevention. By way of another example, as part of its crisis management procedure, the EACCC (European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell) is tasked to identify lessons learned during a debriefing after deactivation.
Another example is in the Counter-Terrorism sector, where the EU Bomb Data System (EBDS) provides a platform for information sharing between experts on lessons learned from incidents.
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By way of an overview, the distribution of crisis management capacities across the seven sectors studied is presented in Figure 1 . It is worth noting that the capacities collected in this research are diverse (e.g., some are bureaucratic protocols, others are technical mapping software), inter-related (e.g., some cyber-related crisis activities apply to energy-grid resilience programs), and are ultimately subjectively categorised (e.g., whether medical aid response teams are part of coordination or decision-making, for instance, is not crystal clear). Care must thus be taken if or when drawing statistical inferences. Such challenges, however, do not deter our goal of sketching the contours and assessing developments of a poorly understood and little-researched empirical area of crisis management.
| DISCUSSION
With the content of the data collection reviewed above, we now turn to a discussion of general findings.
As expected, most capacities relevant for managing crises reside too many systems emerged and administration becomes difficult. It might also be a result of the need (a) to get sufficient data into the detection system and make sure the system is being used, or (b) The rise of sense-making capacities, when compared to previous research (Boin, Ekengren, et al., 2013; Rhinard, 2014a, 2014b) , is worth further exploring. Many of the tools and systems previously focused only on detection and early warning now contain an "information enrichment" and analysis component. Systems that started as detection, threat mapping, and early warningand then grew into sense-making systems-include the "Network A second classical explanation of capacity growth in the EU is policy entrepreneurship by supranational institutions. The Commission is a well-known advocate of European solutions to any and all problems, driven by bureaucratic as well as normative incentives (Pollack, 2003) . Our evidence offers strong indications of Commission entrepreneurship, using crises as windows of opportunity to advance previously stalled initiatives, assembling networks of national officials interested in crisis-related tasks, and promoting analysis of European vulnerability in the face of increasingly complex threats. Finally, one explanation of growth in European level capacities is the cycle of institutionalisation, by which new, broad goals are set out, experimental policies are devised, subsequent problems are ironed out through policy revision, supporting instruments and resources accumulate, vested interests form, and finally, legitimacy grows. This cycle was used in previous accounts of European crisis management developments (Boin, Ekengren, et al., 2013 ) and seems to be validated by the results here.
More generally, and in conclusion, the empirics and analysis presented in this article add to growing evidence that studying modern crisis management demands considering multi-level governance frameworks in which it takes place (Christensen, Laegreid, & Rykkja, 2014; Hollis, 2012; Kuipers et al., 2015) . European and international levels appear to be ramping up their role in, and capacities related to, crisis management, especially considering the transboundary nature of modern crises. Whether we speak of pandemics or ash clouds, or terrorist attacks or cyber breakdowns, national crisis management now takes place within a supranational framework-with important implications for practitioners and academics alike.
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